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ABSTRACT 
Back To Square One: Understanding The Role of The Egyptian Armed Forces 
By 
          Ahmed Ahmed 
Advisor: Jillian Schwedler 
     
Abstract: Six years ago, in 2011 the Egyptian youth took to the streets across Egypt 
demanding freedom from the corrupt, autocratic, and authoritarian Mubarak government. Within 
days, tens of millions of Egyptians demanded the resignation of President Mubarak, who had ruled 
the country for 30 years. Millions of Egyptians were fed up with the rampant corruption of the 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Democratic activists warned that presidential election 
slated for September 2011 were not going to be competitive, rather successional so that Mubarak’s 
son Gamal would be president. Most analysts argue that the vast masses of protests severely 
damaged the ability of Mubarak to continue governing as the Arab Spring swept through the region. 
While the protests were significant, the conventional analysis misses the role the Egyptian military 
played in forcing the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in February of 2011. Discontent within the 
military establishment against the rule of Mubarak had been building up, before climaxing in 2011. 
Military officials held that the mismanagement of Egypt’s economy was a national security threat 
even though the army controlled a significant portion of it. Top generals saw the increasing nature 
of liberalization and privatization of the economy as an insurmountable contest between capital-rich 
firms and a bogged down military bureaucracy. The influx of businessmen and non-military 
appointments of government officials and parliamentarians sidelined the historical influence of the 
military in Egyptian politics. With talks of hereditary succession pointing to educated British 
banker, Gamal Mubarak’s rise to the political spotlight, the Egyptian military looked for the right 
moment to regain their lost status. When the Arab Spring protests began, so did the opportunity to 
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remove Mubarak from power. During the first few days of the protests, military establishment 
leaders openly refused to condemn demonstrators. Instead many declarations legitimatized the 
protests by stating ‘the demands of the people are legitimate and to be addressed.' With protesters 
calling for no less than Mubarak’s resignation and the police force unable to control protests, the 
government looked for the military to reestablish law and order. In response, the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces, a body consisting of the generals of each branch of the armed forces, met 
without the commander-in-chief President Hosni Mubarak for the first time in the entirety of 
Mubarak’s 30-year rule. The symbolic nature of that meeting and the statement by the military that 
it would not intervene to break up demonstrations effectively destroyed any hope for Mubarak’s 
survival, who resigned and was arrested a few days later. Egyptians celebrated and praised the 
military for taking the side of the people, but unknown to most was whose interest the military acted 
in, which was not democratic. 
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While other analysts focus on the role of the demonstrators, I conclude that the Mubarak 
government although severely threatened by the social movement was not shaken at all. The 
cause for his removal from power did not originate from the millions on the ground; rather it 
stemmed from the abandonment of Mubarak by the military, who let him fall from grace to 
protect their role in ruling Egypt. In my research, I explore the relationship between the 30-year 
reign of Mubarak and the Egyptian military. I analyze their interactions together with the factors 
of emerging opposition movements, youth discontent, and crony economic liberalization, as a 
method of explaining the military’s actions during the uprisings. Using primary resources; 
including academic journals articles, books, government documents, and secondary sources; 
newspaper articles, and Arabic reports written and discussed on television about the subject, I 
provide an alternative explanation of the dynamics leading to the 2011 and 2013 reinstallation of 
military rule. Supported by evidence of the economic and political resurrection of the military 
post-2011 and 2013.  
To do so, I first briefly describe the historical role of the Egyptian Military in society, 
politics, and the economy. Second, by exploring the relationship between the army and Egypt’s 
two other previous Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970) and Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), I 
emphasize how the military’s autonomy and interests at many junctions are a point of contention 
with the government. Third, I analyze in-depth the relationship between Mubarak and the 
military during his 30-year reign. Showing how the relationship maintained periods of 
cooperation before splitting apart over different economic and political interests. Fourth, I revisit 
the 18-day uprising in doing so I provide a narrative of the events from the viewpoint of the 
military. Fifth, I track the post-Mubarak and Morsi phase by showing how the military has 
solidified its grip on Egypt, through a new military government. Lastly, concluding that uprisings 
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only succeeded in overthrowing two governments due to the army’s intervention. That when 
analyzing the underlying interests of the military it becomes clear why they behaved in that 
manner. 
Literature Review 
Completed works on the Egyptian revolution and post-revolutionary Egypt is diverse and 
covers a large range of topics. While some of the most popular literature surrounding the Arab 
Spring and the Egyptian revolution focuses on the role of social media and youth mobilization to 
account for the success of the movements, I differed in my approach. During my LR I looked for 
articles and books that related to the Egyptian military and the relationship between the state. 
Here I found that the literature addresses the military in these four ways 1: the civil-military 
relationship between the executive branch of government and the military, 2: economic interests 
the military was involved in, 3: the uprisings, and 4: post-2011 revolution transition phase and 
the role of the military during that period. What I looked to do was built on the existing literature 
to develop an analysis that centers on bringing to the forefront the role of the military in the 2011 
and 2013 revolutions. 
Civil-Military Relations  
To understand the Egyptian military, Hillel Frisch argues that we need to view the 
institution as not encompassing a “guardian role” for the ruling government but as a separate 
institution with diverging interests. Using the David Pion-Berlin definition of a civil-military 
institutional framework, Frisch finds the conditions that produce effective relationships between 
a civilian government and military to be lacking in Egypt.  
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   The reason for this he finds is the presence of civilians in the major defense institutions 
is missing. Second, the empowerment of defense ministries has grown from traditional advice 
and consent roles, to figures who make their own decisions. Third, the military’s chain of 
command operates within itself at a different hierarchy. Within the Egyptian military structure 
exist a 23- member body called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). It is 
comprised of the top generals and high ranking officers from each branch of the army. However, 
instead of reporting to the president, the council answers to directly the Defense Minister and his 
appointed deputy. Decisions of war and troop mobilization are decided within the council and 
not the parliament or executive branch. Frisch concludes that the modus operandi of the Egyptian 
army is a high level of autonomy. For scholars analyzing the Arab Spring in the region, I found it 
necessary to understand how the relationship between the government and the larger security 
apparatuses affected the outcome of the revolutions.  
As Peter Weber notes Tunisia and Egypt are today in such different places on the road to 
democracy. Tunisia's professional military has traditionally steered clear of politics, and when 
Ben Ali's government and fearsome security apparatus collapsed, the military remained neutral 
and was widely respected for that. In Egypt, the military has been the strongest political faction 
since the 1950s, and not only did it appear to take a side of the demonstrators, they played a vital 
role not only in removing President Hosni Mubarak but also his democratically elected 
successor, Mohamed Morsi1.  
Eliezer Be’eri similarly described the Arab world as in a profound crisis of when it comes 
to transitioning to democratic rule. To overcome this obstacle, he argues for a bottom-up 
																																								 																				
1Weber, Peter. "How Tunisia Beat Egypt In The Democracy Game". Theweek.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 11 Mar. 2017. 
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revolutionary change that begins by alternating social structures of the institutions that affect 
government. In many of the Arab Republics, historically no force has played a larger role in 
reorganizing the system other than the officer corps. Military officers when empowered have 
carried changes altering the democratic transition2. 
 In the months after the 2011 revolt, the Egyptian military took steps that were not 
supportive of democracy nor human rights. More than 5,000 civilians and leaders of the 
revolution were brought to military tribunals, denied adequate legal representation and sentenced 
over dubious ‘national security’ crimes3. When Democratic activist rallied against these 
detentions, they were met with extreme violence. One of the first events of brutal military 
repression was the Maspero massacre. Soldiers killed 24 people, and over 200 were wounded in 
the violence4. The military and the ruling SCAF showed they had little tolerance for dissent 
during the period of transition.  
Economic Empire & Patronage  
Abul-Magd Zeinab, exploring the patronage the officer corps enjoyed in Egypt, develops 
historical episodes that tell us of the great political leverage officers enjoyed. Zeinab does this by 
analyzing the economic control the Egyptian military holds using three key phases. First, the 
Camp David Accords in 1979 between Israel and Egypt, allowed the country to receive an 
average of 1.3 billion dollars of U.S aid and millions more from European nations. Second, in the 
1990s when Egypt began implementing Economic Liberalization programs to receive IMF loans, 
																																								 																				
2 Be’eri, E., 1966. The officer class in politics and society of the Arab East. Merhavya: Sifriat Poalim 
[Hebrew]. 
3 "Egypt: Military Trials Usurp Justice System". Human Rights Watch. N.p., 2017. Web. 4 Apr. 2017. 
4 "Cairo Clashes Leave 24 Dead After Coptic Church Protest - BBC News". BBC News. N.p., 2017. Web. 5 Apr. 
2017. 
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and third, in the 2000s, when a ripple in the relationship between the government and the army 
arose, stemming from the privatization of State-owned enterprises.  
Zeinab analyzes the growth of the Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) a separate 
entity from the Defense Ministry. He finds that MOMP operates a whole 30 factories across the 
country. Civilian products produced in these factories include; medical and diagnostic 
equipment; domestic appliances; fire extinguishers, drills, television receivers, computers; 
batteries, electric and water meters, cars, single engine aircraft, and a variety of foods5. As the 
liberalization process intensified in Egypt, so did the competition between private companies and 
the military. A predicament they were not happy to be in. One former Minister of MOMP 
general Sayed Meshal who ran the industry stated that revenue in 1999 accounted for nearly 2 
billion Egyptian pounds a year ($345 million) arising from  the selling back of products to 
civilians. Still, the official revenues of the military remain a secret in the ‘black box’ as it is 
known in Egypt. 
For this paper, I looked to confirm my political assumption that with the rise of a 
business elite, the advantage military held in production diminished. Nadia Farah in her book 
highlights the trend of privatization of many State-Owned Enterprises. Her findings suggest that 
the emergence of the business elite posed an economic threat to the military who enjoyed near 
domination in most areas of production. Describing that as private companies moved with more 
technologically advanced production techniques and a larger access to capital, the military 
struggled to innovate and expand. With Gamal Mubarak leading this charge, it is plausible to 
																																								 																				
5	"Ministry Of Military Production - Special Weapons Agencies - Egypt". Fas.org. N.p., 2017. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.	
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believe the economic empire of the military would have ended had he taken power from his 
father.  
Robert Springborg commenting on the expansive nature of involvement of the military in 
the economy says the question is not what sectors do they invest in, but rather: is there a sector 
that they do not invest in? Estimates have said the army accounts for anywhere between 10 to 40 
percent of Egypt's entire economy6. Mubarak during his tenure had no issue in allowing the 
military to enter the economic frontier initially. In 1981, the nation had already brokered peace 
with arch rival Israel. The issue of independence, sovereignty, war and peace, was settled. New 
concerns moved onto public discussions such as infrastructure revitalization, and industrial 
productivity. To gain military support for his government, Mubarak endorsed pay raises, benefit 
housing and a diversification of the weapons portfolio. Springborg concluded that Mubarak 
might have been trying to pamper a major constituency as he sought to widen backing for other 
items on his political agenda, including efforts to promote Egyptian democracy and economic 
efficiency. 
Uprisings   
              When the revolt began, many analysts scrambled to understand what the military would 
do. Scholars like Ibrahim Karawan argued that the army did not want power because “it does not 
have much to offer, and it knows it.” Concluding that army leadership was keen to pursue rapid 
constitutional reform to prepare the way for free and fair elections”7. Although the conditions 
leading up the revolt were not indicative that Mubarak nor the army were keen to allowing free 
																																								 																				
6	Kholaif, Dahlia. "The Egyptian Army's Economic Juggernaut". Aljazeera.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 30 Mar. 2017.	
	
7	Karawan, Ibrahim A. "Politics and the Army in Egypt." Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53 (2011): 43-50. 
JSTOR. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.	
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elections. Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor argue the military decided to intervene in the uprising 
because “The generals felt their influence slipping away as Mubarak disregarded their economic 
interests, ignored their advice on ministerial appointments, and organized a campaign to transfer 
power to his son against their wishes”8. However, they prematurely conclude that the actions of 
the military were not meant to “overthrow Mubarak”, rather, the intervention was only intended 
to reposition the power dynamics away from crony capitalism and the NDP.  
 These analyses miss key moments in the uprisings. One such example is the SCAF 
excluded Mubarak from their meeting. It also neglects the declarations issued by the military 
recognizing the demands of the people as legitimate and the proclamation that it would not 
disperse protesters. With demands for Mubarak to resign, the military took a de facto stand with 
the demonstrators.      
 Witold Mucha and Ahmed Khalifa see the military intervention as a signal of maintaining 
stability and imposing de-escalation measures. They argue that the role of armed forces from the 
onset of the protests applied a stabilizing function and not a political one. Explaining that 
military wanted to avoid conflict because it craves order. They conclude that the army did not 
open fire to prevent any identification of the military with Mubarak’s security forces. 
Understanding that repressive behavior by the military could have furthered activist to arm 
themselves to defend their cause9. The analysis is correct to point out that the military certainly 
views themselves as separate entities, in which the stability of the nation is not dependent on the 
																																								 																				
8	Martini, Jeff. "Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future." Foreign 
Affairs 90.5 (2011): 127-37. JSTOR. Web. 7 Mar. 2017	
9	Mucha, Witold, and Ahmed Khalifia. "The Military In Egypt Peacemaker With Expiration Date?". Journal of 
African Militaries N/A.N/A (2017): 1-23. Print.	
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government in charge. The paper neglected to address the underlying interests the military works 
to achieve.  
 My analysis considers the literature in a way that incorporates the many arguments into 
one. Highlighting the interests of the military as a way of explaining their actions beyond just a 
security minded viewpoint.  
Post-2011 Resurgence  
While many activists involved in the January 25th protests initially viewed the military as 
guardians of the transition, they came to realize that the military, led by the SCAF, was only 
interested in maintaining its superiority. As early as February 25th, 2011, the military began 
using force to remove protesters from Tahir Square and other areas of gathering. Curfews were 
imposed. Dina Bishara argued the military’s role in the uprisings was a defensive response to 
protect the state, that happened to provide an opprotunity to reclaim lost power. Following the 
SCAF transition period she find that Constitutional Proclamations issued by SCAF strengthened 
both the role of the military in politics and its autonomy from civilian institutions10. Army 
oﬃcers voiced their intention to see an article introduced in the future constitutions which 
guarantees  the military’s vision to “belong to the people” rather than to a government. Also 
ensuring financial and organizational independence of the armed forces from the presidency and 
parliament.  
 
 
																																								 																				
10	Albrecht, Holger, and Dina Bishara. "Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt." 
Middle East Law and Governance 3 (2011): 13-23. Brill. Web. 5 Dec. 2016	
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Historical Background: 
The Egyptian army for six decades has been a solid institutional pillar of the modern 
Egyptian Republic. In 1952, a group of military officers headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser led a 
coup d état against the British-backed monarchy of King Farouk. The officers aimed at not just 
removing the king, but at also creating a new political system. Running off popular support for 
the overthrow of the king, the officers moved to suppress political movements they labeled to be 
weak and corrupted by foreign influence. Power in the new system was consolidated into a 
highly centralized presidential system11, headed by a single political party called the Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU). Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s first military president, in 1954 led the 
country through its post-colonial transition. The ASU drew its support from the populist, 
egalitarian policies it enacted. Abolishing formal titles, redistributing land ownership to peasant 
farmers, and having a populist economic approach, they allowed them to cement governing 
legitimacy.  
Under Nasser’s presidency from 1956-1970, the executive office was turned into an 
unchecked authority, which drew most political appointments from the military12. Civil society 
was curtailed, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and labor unions became illegal 
																																								 																				
11 Angrist, Michele Penner, Nathan J. Brown, Emad Shahin, and Joshua Stacher.Politics & Society in the 
Contemporary Middle East Chapter Egypt Page 218. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Print. 
12  Angrist, 2013  
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under Law 3213 which placed restrictions on the formation and activities of NGOs. Citizens 
faced incarceration for participating in any group deemed illegal by the government.  
The Egyptian military emerging from a colonial army underwent modernization under 
Nasser. With the state using over $216 million dollars in 195514 to expand the size of the 
military. The Pan-Arabism political and social ideology echoed by Nasser was the driving force 
behind growing the role of the military. The resources of the state were steered toward the 
military, whose engineers and contractors took the lead in land reclamation projects, public 
infrastructure development, the administration of essential commodities, and the domestic 
manufacturing of consumer appliances and electronics, as well as the production of industrial 
and agricultural inputs like steel and fertilizer. High-ranking members of the officer corps were 
also appointed to replace civilian factory managers15. 
Nasser was convinced that Egypt had a stake in defending Arab nations from what he 
considered to be “imperialist Arab governments” and sought to expand officer corps ideology to 
the region. Nasser, ordered the dispatch of the Egyptian military and police for training missions 
to Yemen in 1954 and 195716,  to assist military officers in Yemen carry out a overthrow against 
the Saudi and British-backed monarchy. The intervention was a complete and utter failure for 
Nasser and the military. Labeled as Egypt’s Vietnam, the intervention caused the Egyptian 
																																								 																				
13 Angrist, 2013	
14 "Gamal Abdel Nasser." New World Encyclopedia. World Encyclopedia, 25 May 2007. Web. 30 Jan. 2017. 
<http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser>. 
15 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards 
of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981–2011,” Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (Autumn 
2013) 
16 Ferris, Jesse. Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian 
Power. Princeton: Princeton Page 32 , 2013. Print. 
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economy to decline due to deteriorating US-Egyptian relations, leading to the ending of a vital 
food program upon which the Egyptian economy depended on17.  
Egyptians began to feel disillusioned with the military government of Nasser. When the 
humiliating six-day war defeat occurred in 1967, there were hints that a collapse of the 
administration and the military was imminent. Across Egypt, riots broke out against the military, 
whom many Egyptians called traitors and cowards for failing to maintain territorial integrity over 
the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli aggression. The Pan-Arab dream of having the strongest army in 
the region suddenly disappeared because of gross negligence in its leadership18. 
  Nasser prepared his resignation speech in June 1967, claiming he was responsible for 
the swift defeat of Egypt’s military forces. Nasser would later decide against resigning and 
instead offered 50 senior officers and members of the Egyptian ruling elite to stand trial on the 
22nd of January 1968. They were indicted for crimes related to national security, including 
charges of plotting to overthrow the government19. Light sentences were handed down by a 
sympathetic court, but the military’s supremacy in the public eye was severely diminished.  
Early Protests Against Authoritarian Policies  
University students began leading protests against Nasser. Calling for the start of 
democratization in Egypt. Anwar Sadat, who at the time was Vice-President and a prominent 
officer in the military, met with student protesters to mediate relations between the government 
and them. Nasser agreed to concessions by ordering the holding of new elections, establishing a 
																																								 																				
17 Ferris, 2013 
18 Karawan, Ibrahim A. 2011. 
19 Blanga, Yehuda. "Turmoil in Egypt – 1968–2011: The Status of the Armed Forces in Citizen Uprisings in Egypt." 
Contemporary Politics 20.2 (2014): 365-383(Page 5). Web. 8 Mar. 2017. 
<http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.library.csi.cuny.edu/toc/ccpo20/20/3#.VSRnxvnF-Qw>. 
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new administration, and replacing military members of the government20. Nasser hoped to rally 
support by averting attention from the dire economic state of the nation to focus on preparing for 
a new battle against Israel.   
When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, and Anwar Sadat became President, he sought 
to avoid the same mistakes that plagued his predecessor. Sadat realized that the oppressive ruling 
that brutally repressed speech, media, and dissent would not garner patience for his inevitable 
war against Israel. Sadat began to “demilitarize” the Egyptian state by significantly reducing the 
number of army officers in government positions, and ordering the military to focus more on 
preparing for war21. Sadat shifted the military’s expansive economic grip on industries to focus 
more narrowly on defense-related manufacturing. By 1980, Sadat’s last administration, less than 
five ministerial positions were held by military men, compared to 22 of 26 in 196422. 
Sadat’s “corrective revolution” as he called it, relaxed the implementation of Law 32 and 
allowed for NGOs, syndicates, and political groups to emerge. Under Sadat, civil society groups 
could pluralize the discourse of politics and economics. Discontent against Sadat’s opposition for 
a quick war with Israel grew quickly among students. It was in 1971 that the first unified 
opposition movements emerged. The Higher National Committee of Cairo University Students 
and the Student Union, held a 20,000-people strong demonstration against Sadat in Liberation 
Square23, known today as Tahir Square. 
The protests were violently quelled by security forces, but their request was heard. Sadat 
quickly moved to restart diplomatic negotiations with Western powers to attain a peaceful 
																																								 																				
20 Blanga, Yehuda.2014.  
21	Blanga, Yehuda. 2014. 
22 Springborg, Robert. "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today." MERIP 
Middle East Report No. 147.Egypt's Critical Moment (1987):  JSTOR. Web. 13 Feb. 2017. 
23 Blanga, Yehuda 2014 
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settlement over the Sinai Peninsula while seriously preparing for war.  The students’ demands 
were fulfilled on October 6th, 1973, in the Yom Kippur War, which many Egyptians hold as the 
resurrection of the nation. It was the first time in post-colonial Egypt that an alternative force 
besides the military influenced government policy.  
Prequel To 2011 
The war earned the Sadat government and the military a big boost in popularity. In the 
aftermath of the war, the Egyptian army faced the question of how their institution would survive 
a lack of hostilities. In government, they were already in transition to being another bureaucracy. 
Sadat, now entering negotiations with Western powers, held that economic liberalization was the 
path most necessary for Egypt’s economic development.   
Sadat’s government began by privatizing large state-run firms and returned land that had 
been nationalized under Nasser to its former owners. The policy had the desired effect of 
attracting foreign investment. State-sponsored subsidies which many segments of the population 
relied on, needed to be removed for Egypt to receive a $40 million dollar loan from the World 
Bank24. For the military, this was a threat to the egalitarian economic policies they implemented 
since 1952. Military generals warned Sadat that economic insecurity of the growing population 
would be a grave threat to Egyptian national security and advised him not to continue with these 
steps25.    
The liberalization continued despite military opposition and caused enormous social gaps 
and rampant government corruption26. Cumulating into the bread riots of January 1977. The riots 
																																								 																				
24	1977: Egypt's Bread Intifada". Libcom.org. N.p., 2017. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.	
25	Nassef, Sharif. "Shifting Sands: Political Liberalization Of Egypt Since 1952 - Fair Observer". Fair Observer. 
N.p., 2017. Web. 21 Mar. 2017.	
26  Blanga, Yehuda 2014.	
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posed a significant threat to the stability of Sadat. Police were unable to control the outbreak of 
violence across the country, causing Sadat to order the military to help restore stability to the 
nation. Police stations, railways, and the headquarters of the ruling Egypt Arab Socialist Party in 
Cairo were attacked and set on fire.  
The military refused to intervene unless the subsidies were reinstated first27. Sadat caved 
into the demands of the public and reversed his decision. Soldiers deployed to control the 
protests and participated in baking bread for citizens using wheat reserves stored by the 
military28. The riots and contention over subsidies showed how the military could use its strong 
coercive power of stability to make the government adhere to their interests. Had the bread riots 
continued without the military intervention, Sadat’s government would have surely suffered 
damages at a time where he was securing the Camp David accords. The strongman image Sadat 
broadcast to world required a firm and stable government.   
Death of Sadat 
In 1978, Anwar Sadat dissolved the ASU, symbolically ending Nasser’s and the free 
officers’ political legacy. A new party was formed called the National Democratic Party (NDP), 
where the chairperson was the President of the country. ASU leaders renounced their former 
party memberships and flocked to the new NDP in droves29. Leaving the policies and faces 
mostly the same as the ASU. Sadat remained chairman up until his assassination on October 6th, 
1981, at a military celebration commemorating their victory over Israeli forces in 1973. 
																																								 																				
27 Karawan, Ibrahim A. 2011. 
28	Mahr, Krista. "Bread Is Life: Food And Protest In Egypt | TIME.Com". TIME.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 15 Mar. 
2017.	
29 Heiss, Andrew. "The Failed Management Of A Dying Regime: Hosni Mubarak Egypt’s National Democratic 
Party and the January 25th Revolution." Journal of Third World Studies XXIX.1 (2012): 1-18. JSTOR. Web. 2 Mar. 
2017.	
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Subversive conscripted Islamists within the army turned their guns on Sadat for signing the 
historic Camp David Accords in 1979, which recognized and normalized diplomatic relations 
with Israel.  
The Emergence of Hosni Mubarak   
 Hosni Mubarak, the former commander of the Egyptian Air Force and Vice-President, 
became Egypt’s third president on October 7th, 1981. He became the new chairman of the NDP 
immediately after becoming President. Mubarak’s first declaration as President was the 
enactment of Law 1958/64, which placed Egypt under a perpetual state of emergency. Under the 
law, the President could at any time	“whenever public security or order are threatened, by oral or 
written order carry out these acts: 1. Restrict people’s freedom of assembly, movement, 
residence, or passage in particular times and places; arrest suspects or [individuals who are] 
dangerous to public security and order [and] detain them; allow searches of persons and locations 
without being restricted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code30, 2. Order the 
surveillance of letters of any type; supervise censorship; seize journals, newsletters, publications, 
editorials, cartoons, and any form of expression and advertisement before they are published, and 
close their publishing places”31.  
The interior ministry and the Central Security Forces (CSF), both of which were run by 
NDP members, became the primary enforcers of the emergency law. CSF membership was 
around 300,00032 shortly after Sadat’s death. Empowering the security force was vital for 
Mubarak to have an alternative to the military’s ambiguous support for the government. With a 
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large police force equipped to intercept and repress opposition, the government would be free 
implement their policies without fear of being dependent on the military for stability.  
 Mubarak at the same time began ushering in a similar but altered role for the military. 
The Ministry of Defense in 1981 created an economic arm called the National Service Products 
Organization (NSPO) separate from the MOMP. This arm of the military contributed to public 
infrastructure projects to produce cheap civilian goods for the middle and lower classes33. The 
NSPO had its budget and bank account cloaked from civilan oversight and immune from the 
Central Auditing Organization. Making its income and expenses secret from the public domain34. 
Under the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, no article legally mandated oversight of the military’s 
annual budget or any of the related security and defense agencies.  
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala in 1982 looked to transform the military into a for profit 
institution for the country. Through a system of patronage, Ghazala was able to secure benefits 
for the officer corps not seen before in post-colonial Egypt. The military was no longer devoted 
exclusively to warfare preparation; it broadened activities dramatically into areas that are 
traditionally civilian35. The military began heading out into poor regions and started building up 
cities. Areas like Nasr city on the outskirts of Cairo were primarily made for military members 
and their families. The army would construct large apartment blocks using conscripted force as 
cheap labor and would sell back the estate to the rest of the population at a significant profit 
margin. Competition between the military and the private sector grew unbalanced. Civilian 
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companies complained about the lack of access to building contracts handed out by the 
government.  
In essence, Mubarak created a de facto pact with the military. He and the NDP would 
continue to support the military in expanding their commercial network in return for the stability 
they provided for backing his government. From the military’s standpoint, they were able to rule 
but were not needed to govern. Mubarak, still was shown to be weak without military support. 
This became apparent when the CSF started rioting in February of 1986 over the low wages they 
received. For two days, the Interior Ministry was unable to maintain public order, like his 
predecessors Mubarak looked to the military to re-establish control over the country. The riots 
showcased to the NDP and Mubarak that the real protector and keeper of the government was the 
military.  
Growing the Patronage: Economic Liberalization & Crony Capitalism  
 Mubarak in the 1990s began edging Egypt towards full economic liberalization under the 
terms set forth by the $370 million dollar loan provided by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)36. Dozens of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized, and state sponsored 
subsidies to the poor were cut dramatically37.  Mubarak sold SOEs to fellow NDP members who 
in turn shared profits with the party and the government. Mubarak signed Egypt to the Economic 
Restructuring and Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991, and with it38 came the erosion of 
social safety nets.  Income inequality between the wealthy and poor grew exponentially as the 
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year 2000 approached, with 22% of the population living in poverty at just under $2 a day39. The 
liberalization process effectively ended the state-run economy put in place by Nasser and the free 
officers. 
 Social protest at the time was minimal: as the government security apparatus was ruthless 
to any form of public dissent. Security forces were in the midst of putting down a violent Islamist 
insurgency in the ancient city of Luxor spearheaded by terror group called Gamaa al-Islamiyya. 
The terrorist campaign killed over 1,200 Egyptians from 1992- 1997. Mubarak instituted new 
regulations that began to dictate the time, place, and degree of all political discussions40. Secret 
police roamed public areas searching for dissidents. Thousands of alleged dissenters and other 
enemies of the state were incarcerated, tortured, and killed41. 
Tensions Arise: The New Guard, Gamal Mubarak, And the Rise of The Business Elite  
 The emergence of the business class into politics placed a third actor in the middle of the 
government and the military. Headed by Mubarak’s youngest son Gamal, a British-educated 
banker, the NDP had an influx of businessmen who held differing economic intentions than that 
of the military. Political participation by the business elite in Egypt’s parliament increased from 
8 elected officials in 1995 to 150 by 2005 elections42.  
 These businessmen helped influence Egypt’s increased privatization of many industries 
that the state once controlled. The steel industry, once a state-owned enterprise became a 
monopoly consisting of one company owned by infamous NDP member named Ahmed Ezz. 
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Many Egyptians regard him as a corrupt and deplorable individual who created a business 
environment that made it impossible to buy an apartment due to the high construction cost of 
steel. Close associate of Gamal Mubarak, Ezz controlled two-thirds of the steel market, giving 
him the ability to control the price of an essential building material43. Both engaged in patronage 
relationship that was masked in the language of the free market. During the revolution of 2011 
Ezz’s name was condemned by protesters alongsde with Hosni Mubarak.   
For the military privatization was a significant threat to its vast economic empire44. State 
enterprises quickly passed into the hands of crony capitalists. As neoliberal reforms expanded, 
the military found itself with severe competition from their neoliberal counterparts with access to 
a greater amount of capital45. The military involved in many civilian production sectors such as 
steel, wheat, automobiles, food items, electronic appliances, and cement struggled to maintain a 
competitive edge. To offset against the Mubarak government campaign of economic 
liberalization and privatization, Egypt’s military leaders diversified their financial portfolio. 
Beginning with financing technology from foreign and domestic private sector sources, as well 
as joint partnerships with a variety of nonmilitary businessmen and foreign interests. Embarking 
on projects such as building wind farms, medicine, and medical facilities. Leaving the Egyptian 
state liable for potential financial losses while the military enjoyed de facto control over 
revenues46. 
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Mubarak attempted to calm their fears by using the funds generated from Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to fill the pockets of loyal generals. By giving them something in return, 
Mubarak hoped for complete subordination to the office of the president47.  Many viewed 
Mubarak’s eagerness to attain the support of top generals as a safety mechanism for the 
succession of his son Gamal to the presidency. Since becoming president in 1981, Mubarak had 
refused to appoint a Vice-President or second in command, unlike his predecessors; even after 
narrowly escaping an assassination attempt on his life in June of 1995 in Ethiopia.  
In the year 2000, Gamal took his first steps in the top echelons of politics when he 
became Assistant Secretary- General of the NDP: third in command to the chairperson48 (Hosni 
Mubarak). The military establishment saw with increasing discomfort the rise of Gamal Mubarak 
as his father’s heir apparent49. 
More worrying for them was the events transpiring in Syria at the same time. Bashar Al 
Assad inherited power in a single-candidate election from his father Hafez Al-Assad when he 
died in the year 2000. Hafez was public about the succession of his son(s), unlike Mubarak. The 
Syrian parliament, shortly before Hafez died, enacted constitutional amendments that lowered 
the required presidential age from 40 to 34, the age of Bashar at the time50. Hafez made Bashar 
enlist in the military in 1999, and he quickly rose to Colonel ranking. This was a last-ditch 
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attempt to garner support within the Syrian army after his long-serving military son Basil Assad 
abruptly perished in an automobile accident in 199451.  
The Egyptian Military and the public were not accepting to moves of Gamal’s rise to 
attaining the presidency because Egyptians viewed this as a step back towards the familial rule. 
They joked that Egypt was returning to the days of the pharaohs except without the vast amounts 
of gold. Speculation of succession was avoided by Mubarak and the government until it became 
unavoidable in the last days of the government.  
The Illusion of Political Competition 
The NDP under the influence of Gamal and what political scientists in Egypt referred to 
as the “new guard” (comprised of business elites and young, affluent members) of the party, 
introduced a constitutional amendment in Parliament that made it possible for the first time in 
Egypt’s history to hold direct presidential elections slated for September 200552. Democratic 
activist viewed this as a positive step for democratization. Political parties in Egypt had grown 
substantially over the years. Notable groups included April 6th, a youth-centered political party, 
and the Egyptian Movement for Changed known as Kifaya53, which translates to “Enough”54, a 
direct reference to the frustration with the long tenure of Mubarak. For the first time they could 
bring forward to the public discourse a wide range of topics from economic policy and societal 
issues, to police brutality.     
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 Mubarak announced his bid for re-election at the age of 77, and the opposition rallied 
around presidential candidate Ayman Noor of the Future Party, who became the first person in 
Egypt’s history to challenge a sitting president. The elections were marred by accusations of 
police intimidation against opposition voters. Independent observers and press were prohibited 
from overseeing the elections. In the end, Mubarak won with 88.6% of the vote55.Opposition 
members questioned the legitimacy of the elections. Noor was subsequently arrested by security 
forces short after on charges of forging elections documents and was sent to prison for five years, 
where he was subjected to torture before being released on medical grounds in 2009.  
 Mubarak promised in his new presidential term to appoint a vice-president, further 
encourage political freedoms, and to address the economic poverty many faced. However, fears 
in the military and public of hereditary- succession grew when Mubarak refused to designate a 
vice-president56. Citizens encountered rising costs in July of 2006 as the government increased 
the prices of transportation, electricity, and communications, placing further pressures on 
workers’ limited incomes57, coupled with a steady rise of inflation. Mubarak sought to counter 
any hint of instability by increasing the budget of the CSF and the interior ministry headed by 
dispised Habib Al Hadley from $583 million in 2002 to $3.3 billion in 2008 compared to the 
srmy’s budget that merely doubled58. The government ensured that opposition movements, 
demonstrations, and elections were carefully monitored and stiflied. Egypt drifted deeper into a 
police state, rather than a military state.  
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The End Of Mubarak  
2011 was set to be Mubarak’s final year as President. Elections were set for September 
2011. Public opinion polls conducted, as Arafat reports, say Egyptians realized the NDP were 
actively promoting Gamal and selling his image to the public. In the years and months pre-dating 
the revolution, Gamal had been accompanying his father on many international visits, including 
to the United States. These were measures taken to prepare him for the presidency. However, the 
polls also indicated that not all Egyptians saw a Gamal presidency as a negative aspect. To some, 
the Mubarak family had been a pillar of stability and economic growth. Tourism industries 
boomed under him, and a middle-class began to slowly emerge. Arafat concedes, overcoming 
public opposition may have been possible, but overcoming his lack of military affiliation and 
persuading the generals to back him is an entirely different task.59  
Leaked WikiLeaks cables signal that hypotheses might be true. In one these tapes, 
Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi can allegedly be heard strongly objecting to Gamal, due to his 
economic policies. Advising his deputies that Gamal would not only threaten their interests but 
the interests of Egypt as a whole60. Other senior military officials held that it would wipe out the 
glory of the July 1952 Revolution (the Free Officers’ Revolution)61. A collision course between 
the army and the government looked unavoidable.  
 The last two years of the Mubarak government (2008–2010) witnessed an increase in the 
number of demonstrations, protests, sit-ins and strikes by workers62. The Military advised the 
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government to implement more wage increases and subsidies to curb the growing poverty rate 
that neared 27% in 2010. Nearly 40% of the population by 2011 lived on under two dollars a 
day63. The social upheaval was brewing. It just needed a spark.  
 Signs of a pending revolt came in April of 2008 when workers of the textile industry 
staged a general strike in the city of Mahalla. The opposition movement called for labor unions 
across the country to join in. Doctors, engineers, and public workers vowed to stop working. The 
government and the CSF warned that they would “take necessary and resolute measures toward 
any attempt to demonstrate, impede traffic, hamper work in public facilities or to incite civil- 
disobedience this”64. Riot police arrested and beat workers, amidst a massive deployment of CSF 
stifled protests. The government succeeded in bottling up the anger temporarily, but citizens 
tolerance for the status quo grew shorter by the day.  
Revolution 2011 
 The trigger for revolt came in neighboring Tunisia on December 17th, 2010, when a street 
vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of local government building, in 
Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in Tunisia65. Images of his self-immolation after being humiliated by 
security forces who destroyed his products and assaulted him were broadcast throughout the 
Arab world through social media, television, and newspapers. Protests engulfed Tunisia until 
they reached the capital of Tunis on December 27th. President Ben Ali, who had ruled the small 
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Arab nation for 25 years, found his government crumbling without the support of the military. 
He fled to Saudi Arabia, leaving a caretaker government in charge.  
 Egyptians watched the events transpire in Tunisia and felt empowered to act. Like 
Mohammed Bouazizi was the Egyptian case of Khalid Said, whose bloodied tortured body was 
left outside a police station in Alexandria after being arrested at a café a night before in June 
2010. Graphic images of his body circulated throughout Egyptian private media. Protests were 
held in Tahir Square, Alexandria, Luxor and the other main cities in July of 2010 denouncing 
police brutality66.  
 The April 6th movement in early January of 2011 named the initial protest against 
Mubarak “We are all Khaled Said”. Viral videos of young Egyptians vowing to partake in the 
protests quickly spread online. January 25th became a save-the-day event, which fell on National 
Police Day. Government officials downplayed the significance of the protests stating that “the 
youth just want to blow off some steam.” Mubarak was confident in the ability of the CSF to 
maintain order saying, “Egypt is not Tunisia.”  
Tens of thousands of protesters flocked to protest meet ups across Egypt’s major cities. 
Security forces initially allowed protesters to enter public squares but quickly began attempting 
to disperse crowds with tear gas, concussion grenades, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. 
Injuries and fatalities mounted quickly. January 28th saw the fiercest of street battles between 
protesters and CSF; images of the carnage on the street stoked fears of a coming civil war.  
When the protests intensified, Mubarak attempted to fulfill some overdue demands. 
He appointed the country's head of intelligence Omar Suleiman to the post of vice-president, and 
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Ahmad Shafiq, a former chief of the air force, was selected prime minister in a cabinet 
reshuffle67. Mubarak attempted to appease the people by dissolving the primary leadership 
structure of the NDP. He remained party chairman but appointed Hossam Badrawy a centrist 
liberal as the secretary-general68. Ahmed Izz, the steel tycoon, resigned from the NDP as 
protesters burned portraits of his face in Tahir Square. Protesters targeted the NDP headquarters 
situated two blocks from the historic center of the protests in Cairo. The building was set ablaze 
by the demonstrators, after being ransacked.  
Military Intervention  
With carnage on the streets, the military emerged openly on the political scene for the 
first time in years. Declaring that it supports a democratic transition according to the 
constitutional plan offered by the leaders of both sides. Demonstrators ideveloped the narrative 
of military backing because that was what they wanted to believe. Egyptians viewed the military 
as the only non-elitist institution because it is made up of conscripted force. More importantly, 
they wanted the army to see itself as separate from the corrupt government. Hoping that by 
appealing to the moral stature of the military, they would make it difficult for the military 
generals to take a decisive stand for the government, despite the bias of senior officers who saw 
the president as a source of generous patronage77.  
According to Springborg, during the days before Mubarak stepped down, the military 
was enjoying wide, popular support while other elements of the government absorbed popular 
anger, despite being subordinate to the military69. The military was able to exploit the 
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revolutionary sentiments of Egyptians to justify its withdrawal as the backer of the Mubarak‘s 
government. In playing with these feelings, the military aligned itself with the efforts of 
protesters to the extent that it could be seen as protecting the people against a now illegitimate 
government. As such, many of the protesters were undeterred by violence because they knew the 
military would step in to protect them. 
Discussions about a post-Mubarak Egypt was in full-swing across the country, and the 
noose around the government neck grew by the day. Protesters overwhelmed the CSF, leading to 
a majority of officers defecting and withdrawing from the streets. Mubarak summoned the 
military deployment into the streets to restore order by enforcing a curfew in the main cities. On 
January 30th, 2011, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and republican guards were stationed in 
Egypt’s cities. Protesters cheered the military as liberators as they entered city centers and 
squares. Soldiers did nothing to hold back tens of thousands of demonstrators defying the curfew 
and even moved armored vehicles in front of a crowd to defend against attacks by remaining  
CSF members and hired thugs70. 
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a military body consisting of 23 top 
generals from the branches of the armed forces met on February 10th, in the absence of the 
commander-in-chief and newly appointed Vice President Suleiman71. This was the third time in 
its history that they convened without the commander-in-chief, the previous times occurred in 
1967, and 1973 both of which took place during wartime. They released a strong message after 
the meeting stating that the military would not fire nor disperse protesters. Adding that the 
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people’s demands were legitimate72. The SCAF in series of press communiques added “honest 
people refused the corruption and demanded reforms, we warn against touching the security and 
safety of the nation and the people73. Both the public and the military shared the same objective, 
the removal of Mubarak, and an end to the government. 
The Mubarak government perhaps sensing that without the CSF crushing protesters, and 
with the reluctance of the military to intervene on their behalf, that the end had come. Instead of 
having a humiliating public military coup, the government decided on portraying a dignified exit 
instead. Omar Suleiman on the night of February 11th, 2011, read Mubarak’s final public 
statement announcing his resignation, and annoucing governing power would be given to the 
SCAF. Historically marking an end to the 30-year rule of Mubarak.	
The actions of the military went widely unestimated in the media during the 2011 
revolution for understandable reasons. Many credited the protesters’ non-violent measures and 
social media usage as the root for the collapse of the government. Hirschkind argues “activist 
bloggers from across broad political spectrums were brought together online through a shared 
sense of what were the most pressing policy challenges Egyptians faced”74. The unification of 
rivals on social media indeed created an imminent threat to the government. This was made 
evident by the event on January 29th, 2011 when Egyptians lost all cell phone and internet 
service. The shutdown caused a 90 percent drop in data traffic to and from Egypt, crippling an 
important communications tool used by antigovernment protesters and their supporters to 
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organize and to spread their message75. Despite the shutdown, protesters managed to gather in 
protest areas, due to networking structures of civil society.  
Others like Albrecht and Bishara argue that the military was reluctant to intervene in the 
uprising but did so because they feared a larger crisis. They state “the military’s intervention here 
could be seen as an attempt to manage the unfolding crisis temporarily…. it was not clear that 
the army had ambitious plans to assume a more prominent role in politics”76. While the military 
craves order, it had shown in the past that the survival of the government was not mutually 
exclusive to stability. Showcased shortly after February 18th when Mubarak, Gamal, Alaa 
(Mubarak’s oldest son), Habib Al Hadley, Ahmed Izz, and other cronies of the government were 
immediately placed under arrest by the military. The military charged them with corruption, 
killing protesters, embezzlement, and betraying the public trust77.  
Solidifying Gains: Post-Mubarak Transition 
Pro-democracy activists were elated with the military’s action during the 18-day uprising, 
and they looked for them to move the process forward. For the army, their interest was 
reestablishing control over the country. The belief in building a democratic political system 
remained low on the priority list. In the months after the 2011 revolution, Egypt did experience 
some small but significant moves towards democracy. The SCAF legalized political parties that 
were once banned. Instituted presidential terms limits, strengthened judicial oversight of 
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elections, and created a more transparent process for the registration of political parties78. These 
measures not only satisfied the demands of the revolutionaries but guaranteed the military that no 
powerful executive would emerge to face them. The diversity of the political parties also ensured 
that an NDP similar monopoly on power would be impossible to develop.   
In March 2011, the SCAF declared a constitutional declaration that unilaterally amended 
55 provisions of the 1971 constitution. The most significant amendments empowered the 
military’s interest. It legally prohibited civilian oversight of the army’s budget, mandated the 
military would elect a defense minister from its ranks rather than be appointed, declared that 
decisions of war rested solely with the SCAF, and affirmed not to take presidential opinions into 
considerations79.   
The generals sought to maintain their economic and political status within a demanding 
population. The military feared that prolonged public governing of the country would lead to 
growing backlash against them. However, relinquishing power before securing their stake in 
Egypt’s future was also counterproductive. Activists became discontent with the prolonged 
response of authorities in bringing accused killer cops to judicial proceedings. They held that 
remnants, called Faloul in Arabic, Mubarak officials within the security apparatus, remained in 
control. According to Norton “five million Egyptians worked for the government. This included 
a multitude of security forces that are dedicated to controlling political space, ferreting out 
dissent, and short-circuiting even innocuous challenges to the state…. the internal security 
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apparatus was largely untouched by the ‘Revolution’80”. In July of 2011, protesters took to the 
streets denouncing the military’s failure to address the deteriorating economic status 
adequately81.   
In response, a clamp down on democratic activists from 2011- 2012 led to over 7,000 
people, including bloggers, journalists, and protesters, being tried in closed military trials82. 
Reports of women being subjected to cruel and humiliating “virginity tests” drew widespread 
international condemnation against the SCAF83. The initial positive image the military gained 
during the revolution began to fade away as numerous, successive blunders and missteps 
highlighted its self-interested political and economic motives. The events weakened its 
popularity and called into question the sincerity of its role as the defender of the Egyptian state84.  
The SCAF moved quickly to hold parliamentary elections, hoping to shift scrutiny to 
civilian leaders. Newly formed political parties scrambled to develop electoral networks across 
Egypt. Elections were slated for November 2011, and only Islamist parties like the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) and their political offshoot the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the ultra-
conservative Islamic Salafist Nour Party had pre-existing networks that assisted them in securing 
votes. Democratic and youth activists accused the military of agreeing to early elections as a part 
of a pact with Islamist groups. As upheaval grew, the Muslim Brotherhood actively reined in its 
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young supporters. Discouraging them from participating in anti-SCAF protests in the months 
leading up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 201285. 
Secular parties failed to establish support bases in the few shorts months after being 
legally established. Their failure to do so can be attributed to the oppressive atmosphere they 
operated in under Mubarak. While the MB and other Islamist groups were banned during the 
governments of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, were able to form support through charities, 
Islamic schools, mosques, and free health clinics.   
Islamist parties won in a landslide fashion claiming 358 out of 508 seats in parliament, 
giving them a majority of 66 out of 100 seats on the parliamentary constitutional committee 
tasked with drafting Egypt’s post-revolution Constitution.  Egyptians, especially the minority 
Coptic Christian community feared that Islamization of Egypt would lead to greater religious 
sectarianism. Many anticipated an Algerian civil war scenario, where in the 1990s, the military-
ruled government of Colonel Chadli Bendjedid legalized political parties and an Islamist group 
similar to the MB called the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) became the prominent political 
adversary to the government. In Algeria, the military hoped “none of the new political parties 
would be able to amass sufficient support to challenge truly the military-backed National 
Liberation Front (FLN). However, it miscalculated, for Islamist parties were organizing 
themselves rapidly increasing their support bases”.86 The FIS was able to win parliamentary 
elections in 1990. Their victory caused the Algerian military to annul the election results, causing 
an armed rebellion that lasted from 1990-1998, killing a hundred thousand Algerians.  
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 Sensing similarities to Algeria, the SCAF in July of 2011 introduced constitutional 
provisions that gave them the legal basis to intervene in Egyptian politics under a broad array of 
circumstances, including to protect the secular nature of the state87. This was an early indication 
that showed the SCAF had limited trust with Islamist groups. Presidential elections were divided 
into two rounds slated for May and June of 2012, giving political parties barely enough time to 
prepare candidates for elections. The Egyptian military stated for the first time that it would not 
field a candidate for President, leaving the door open for a civilian president. The MB, the largest 
political bloc in parliament vowed not to field a candidate for president. Many saw this as 
political rhetoric at the time to allay fears of a power grab by Islamist forces. 
 Twenty-three candidates filed to run for president; each with diverse backgrounds and 
affiliations, giving Egyptians a real chance to choose a candidate that suited them. Not wanting 
their majority in parliament to be triumphed by the eventual executive, the MB reversed course 
and decided on fielding a presidential candidate with Mohamed Morsi.         
The final round of elections pitted Morsi against Ahmad Shafiq the last Prime Minister 
under Mubarak in a highly-boycotted election round. Many Egyptians felt that choosing between 
an Islamist and a Mubarak crony did not represent the demands of the revolution for real change. 
Morsi picked up 51% of the vote with 13.2 million ballots, compared to Shafiq’s 12.3 million 
votes at 49%88. The SCAF, before transitioning power to Morsi, ordered the dissolution of 
parliament on June 14th, 2012, through the Supreme Constitutional Court. The court cited 
“misapplication of rules for independent candidates” during the election process as a significant 
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violation of constitutional principles89.  Islamist labeled the dissolution as a coup but stopped 
short of calling for demonstrations, as the committee tasked with writing the constitution was left 
untouched. The SCAF final decree on June 17th, 2012 removed significant foreign policy 
decision-making powers from the executive and removed national security duties from the 
president. The election of Morsi looked to be symbolic rather than substantial compared to the 
vast powers the SCAF wielded from the barracks.  
 Supporters of the democratic process argued that the Egyptian military should adopt the 
Turkish army model. As Sakallioglu describes in The Anatomy of the Turkish Military	“The most 
crucial feature of the Turkish military's political autonomy, which in turn distinguishes it from 
armies elsewhere in the Third World, is its acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and 
civilian rule”90. While the Egyptian military recognizes “rule” whether it be democratic or 
autocratic it does so when its interests are aligned with that of the ruling government. The 
Turkish military more often finds their interests aligning with the government. For example, the 
Turkish military now favors the capitalist market economy system over the state-run economy, a 
vast difference from the Egyptian military’s protection of their economic system. Similarities 
between both armies rest on their belief in defending the nature of the secular state. In September 
of 2012 over 300 Turkish military members were put on trial accused of plotting a coup to 
prevent the Islamization of Turkish society from policies enacted by the Erdogan government. 
Turkey’s strict secularism was engraved into the Muslim-majority country by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, and they feared that that vision was slipping away91. This type of subordination and 
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vulnerability of officers at the hands of the ruling government was a scenario the Egyptian 
military worked to avoid during the one-year rule of Morsi.     
Morsi’s Battle With The Military   
 In jostling with the military for power, Morsi successfully sidelined the old guard of the 
SCAF. August 2012 saw the retirement of Mubarak-era officials, with defense minister Tantawi, 
army chief of staff Sami Anan and other senior generals forced into retirement92. Morsi signaled 
moves towards aggressively reclaiming the political power that the military had enjoyed since 
the fall of Hosni Mubarak.  
In November of 2012, recognizing a legal decision ordering the dissolution of the 
committee writing the constitution by Egypt’s High Court, Morsi issued a presidential decree, 
giving his decisions immunity from judicial oversight. He defended his actions by “portraying 
his order as an attempt to fulfill popular demands for justice and protect the transition to a 
constitutional democracy”93. Revolutionary groups decried the move as a betrayal of their 
claims. They quickly organized protests around the presidential palace, resulting in the deaths of 
ten people mostly anti-Morsi demonstrators. Human Rights Watch charged that Morsi’s 
December 6th speech where referred protesters as “hired thugs”,  inflaming tensions, “Instead of 
condemning illegal detentions and abuse right outside the presidential palace, President Morsi 
spoke out against the victims”94 the report concluded. The military decided to intervene as 
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unrests grew, positioning themselves carefully between protesters and the palace, appearing 
reluctant to endorse or condemn the movement95.  
Legal scholars argued the declaration was unprecedented, something the Mubarak 
government never attempted over the course of 30 years. Morsi’s defiance gave him the upper-
hand as the committee survived legal scrutiny. Islamists rushed to complete the constitution amid 
a boycott by the minority secular forces serving on the committee. 
 The political-Islam orientated constitution passed in a referendum held in December 
2012. Secularist and human rights groups criticized the document as overreaching and imposing: 
referring to articles “regulating women’s role as caregivers”96. The military’s role in the new 
document was enhanced giving them the “authority to put civilians on trial in military courts, and 
the task of adopting strategies for establishing security, identifying security threats, and taking 
actions to address them”97. Also guaranteed in the constitution was an exemption from the ban 
on forced labor allowing for the continuation of the military’s conscript labor system and secrecy 
for the military’s institutional finances. 
 Maneuvering through political obstacles, Morsi sought to find common ground with the 
army in the economic sector. In late 2012, Mori unilaterally declared an end to the privatization 
of public sector companies. In an attempt to save military factories set for sell-offs under 
economic restructuring plans. February 2013, an announcement posted on the FJP’s official party 
website revealed that the MOMP had acquired the failed and highly indebted Al-Nasr 
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Automotive Manufacturing Company98.The manufacturing and assembly of passenger cars and 
other nonmilitary vehicles have always been central to the economic fortunes of Egypt’s 
military, as the technologies, facilities, and equipment made available through the collaborative 
manufacturing of military vehicles can also be used in the production of civilian vehicles sold by 
the military on the domestic market. 
 The thaw between the two groups emerged when plans relating to the Suez Canal 
expansion project strained the relationship. Ever since its opening in 1869, the canal has been a 
focal point in Egyptian nationalism, something the military has abused to declare necessity to 
control for themselves. For many years the military envisioned turning the Suez Canal into a 
major logistics hub and center of heavy manufacturing. The military’s economic planners made 
various gregarious  proposals to establish solar, wind, and geothermal  power stations in and 
around Suez to capitalize on the area’s industrial manufacturing potential.  
The military’s companies would play key roles in constructing and providing equipment 
for such projects, as the MOMP have factories capable of manufacturing things like industrial 
plants, steel, and textiles. FJP officials announced plans in early 2013 to turn the canal into a 
global logistics hub; it seemed the political will and state support for such a project was finally 
available99. 
Egyptian government consultant revealed that oversight of the expansion would be in the 
hands of a single chairman who would have the rank of deputy prime minister and report directly 
to Morsi, relegating the military to just one among many government bodies involved in the 
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effort. This move to marginalize the military’s role in the largest infrastructure project in decades 
may have been critical to the FJP’s ultimate loss of military support100. 
On March 19, 2013, Morsi announced that India was to be Egypt’s lead partner in the 
massive expansion. Two days later, Defense Minister Sisi and other military official quoted in 
newspaprs said that the government’s plans for the Suez expansion project would not move 
forward until the army approved the details. Sisi warned against any foreign involvement in the 
project that might cause future controversies, a direct challenge to Morsi and his negotiations 
with foreign nations101.The backlash Morsi faced with the Suez led him to attempt to replace 
Sisi. A plan that was ultimately abandoned in the face of opposition from within the military 
establishment102. 
 Morsi in his attempt to establish a political and economic foothold ignored the decaying 
state of Egypt’s tourism and security. The country was plagued by daily electrical outages and a 
scarcity of gasoline supplies. Citizens complained about the lack of police presence and a rising 
crime rate. The CSF two years after being decimated by the revolution were still unable to 
restructure. Some attributed this vacuum under Morsi to the deep state. During the protests 
around the administrative palace officers openly refused orders to disperse demonstrators. They 
accused Morsi of attempting to politicize the interior ministry. Top-ranking officers trained with 
the mindset of arresting MB members found themselves receiving orders from the very people 
they once regularly arrested. Instead of focusing on resolving these issues, Morsi continued his 
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campaign to solidify power by purging of thousands of judges he deemed to be sympathetic to 
secular leanings103.    
 Youth organizations of April 6th and the Kifaya movement began calling for early 
elections in April of 2012, citing Morsi’s failure in adhering to the demands of the revolution. 
The “tamarod” movement known as “rebel” sought to gather 14 million signatures, one million 
more than the 13 million Morsi received in the presidential elections104. Recent revelations 
through audio-leaks suggest that the Egyptian intelligence played a funding role for tamarod. In 
one such recording, top Generals Kamel and Sobhy say, “ we need two hundred thousand in 
tamarod’s account…from mukhabarat (intelligence)” 105. The authenticity of these types remains 
highly disputed. If the Egyptian military truly supported the tamarod movement, it would show 
that indeed they studied the Turkish army’s policy regarding the Islamist-oriented rule, wherein 
1997 the government of Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign after the military moved to 
“nullify the supposed Islamization of Turkey and fortify the secular system”106. Although the 
definition of Islamization differs from Egypt to Turkey, the concept of a red line in regards to 
how far religion plays a role in government and society is key.  
 Egyptians watched with increasing discomfort the rise of Islamic rhetoric on television 
and radio stations. Hard-core Islamist preachers openly discussed their desires to see the 
pyramids and other ancient monuments destroyed107. Salafists urged Egyptian Muslims not to 
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wish Coptic Christians holiday greetings. These viewpoints resonated very negatively with 
Egyptians, who for thousands of years viewed diversity and history as a foundation for Egyptian 
identity. Strong public anger erupted again when Morsi appointed a former terrorist of Gamaa al-
Islamiyya as Governor of Luxor, the very city his organization terrorized in the 1990s108.  
Morsi’s short-rule seemed to be heading towards him altering the economic system that 
the military enjoyed. His foreign policy decisions were troubling for them. One example was his 
stance of opening the gates of “jihad” on the Syrian government. The speech delivered in Cairo’s 
Olympic soccer stadium on June 15th, 2013 attended by former jihadists who were imprisoned 
under Mubarak, essentially committed  Egypt to a brutal civil war. Promises of immunity for 
Egyptians who travel to fight the infidel Syrian military and it is supporters alarmed the security 
establishment109, who feared battle-trained fighters would look to launch other campaigns against 
and from Egypt. This was substantiated just one day after the controversial speech when four 
Egyptian Shiite Muslims were brutally murdered in Cairo110 .    
June 30th, 2013 was chosen as the mass protest day against Morsi by the opposition. MB 
and other Islamist movements labeled those participating in demonstrations as “religious 
traitors” worthy of killing, giving the situation a possible religious undertone between moderates 
and conservatives. Tens of millions of people descended on Egypt’s major cities demanding 
Morsi accept early presidential elections or resign.  
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Unlike the 2011 revolution, demonstrators did not face off against CSF members. In 
many instances, the police openly participated in the protests and joined in on anti-Morsi chants. 
Causalities and injuries from the anti-Morsi camp remained low as the days went on. The 
Egyptian military showed in the early few days of the protest the military’s willingness to 
intervene once again. A 48-hour ultimatum was issued to Morsi, where he was threatened with 
intervention if he failed to compromise with demonstrators111.   
Morsi in a speech refused to accept the core demands of the opposition and instead took 
on a defiant tone. With the prospect of a collision between two rival camps, the military moved 
in to remove Morsi from power. General Sisi surrounded by leaders of the opposition, the Coptic 
Pope, Sunni scholars, and youth parties announced that the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court Aldy Monsour would act as interim president until new elections. The military suspended 
the Islamist constitution by reinstating the 1971 constitution. Unlike 2011 revolution, the SCAF 
did not take over governing duties but instead handed power to a technocratic administration, but 
behind the scenes, the generals worked to destroy any opposition to the new status quo. 
Military Dominance 
 Security forces backed by the army moved swiftly to arrest Morsi and the top leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. They aimed to take out at the backbone of support for ousted Morsi. 
Embarking on dramatic steps, including arresting the group's spiritual leader, Mohammed Badie, 
from a seaside villa and flew him by helicopter to detention in Cairo112. Khairat el-Shater, a 
successful Brotherhood businessman, was also arrested and had his assets frozen. The two were 
wanted for inciting the killing of protesters in front of the Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo. 
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Arrest warrants were issued for 300 top-ranking Brotherhood members. Egypt's public 
prosecutor ordered Morsi and 35 co-accused to stand trial on charges including conspiring with 
foreign organizations to commit terrorist acts in Egypt and divulging military secrets to a foreign 
state113. 
 Supporters of Morsi and those against the coup by military amassed in Rabia al-Adawiya 
Square in central Cairo to protest the events transpiring. On August 14, security forces crushed 
the sit-in in Rabia al-Adawiya Square. Videos and a report by Amnesty International said that the 
military used armored personnel carriers, bulldozers, ground forces, and snipers, attacked the 
makeshift protest encampment, where demonstrators, including women and children, had been 
camped out for over 45 days, and opened fire on the protesters, killing at least 817 and likely 
more than 1,000114. 
 The Rabia event altered the political discourse completely. In the months after the 
military-backed government banned street protests by applying jail time or heavy fines to the 
public demonstrations115. Journalists, academics, students, and civil society members were all 
subjected to arrest. The reality on the ground signaled that the peaceful nature of 2011 uprising 
was now a distant memory.   
 General Sisi’s election to the Presidency with 97 percent of the vote in 2014 where the 
opposition was non-existent amid crackdowns and arrests gave the military an unchecked seat to 
rule Egypt once again. Today, 17 of Egypt’s 27 provincial governors are military generals, and 
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the remaining civilian governors share rule with 24 major generals serving as deputy governors, 
secretaries-general, and assistant secretaries-general116. A $12 billion dollar from Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, allowed Sisi to ignore economic policy temporarily. The 
much-needed economic assistance was a strong indication of support for Sisi and a way to shore 
up his legitimacy and viability.  
Plans for the Suez Canal Corridor Development Project the one that led to the rupture 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and Sisi is now firmly in the hands of the military-dominated 
Suez Canal Authority and has even become more ambitious. The project involves the expansion 
of six Egyptian ports, the construction of a number of tunnels and industrial zones, and the 
dredging of a lateral canal to allow for two-way traffic. All being constructed by the Egyptian 
Armed Forces Engineering Authority.  
Conclusion:  
Six years after the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s politics is once again dominated by the 
military. The Arab Spring gave hope that tech-savvy youths could alter the power dynamics of 
authoritarian governments in the region. In Egypt, youth-driven mass protests shook the 
foundation of the 30-year rule of Mubarak. They sacrificed their lives and limbs in pursuit of 
pro-democratic change. Their use of peaceful mass demonstrations certainly deserves 
recognition. Their role while significant was limited in bringing the end of the government. 
Analysts who focused solely on the role of the protesters failed to account for the resurgent 
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return of the military to politics. This analysis presented how the military has kept its power 
intact despite challenges from various governments.  
Nasser and the free officers first established the role of the army as a beacon of pan-
Arabism whose destiny was to dominate the region. Military members filled prominent political 
positions. As they grew in numbers so did criticisms leveled against them. Blunders and failed 
policies nearly led to their collapse after the 1967 six-day war defeat. Sadat, in a reversal of his 
predecessor, attempted to sideline the military from politics, removing them from key decision-
making posts. His build up to Yom Kippur War gave Sadat the ability to keep the military 
preoccupied. Their influence and demands were hard to ignore after the conclusion of hostilities 
with Israel. As neo-liberal reforms were increased with Egypt’s Western alliance, so did violent 
social episodes. Once again, the government found itself dependent on the military for stability 
and protection.  
Mubarak, after building up a vast network of business enterprises for the military, found 
himself in the crosshairs of the military. The rise of a business elite led by his son Gamal, not 
only threatened the military’s economic empire but caused large portions of Egyptians to live in 
poverty. Mubarak failed to introduce democratic reforms. Instead, he focused on preserving the 
political monopoly of the NDP hoping to pave the path for Gamal to attain the presidency. When 
the 2011 revolution began, and Mubarak found himself without the brutal police state he had 
empowered, it became apparent that the military would not sacrifice their dwindling influence in 
politics by saving Mubarak. Instead, they let him fall, hoping that by leading the transition never 
again would they be at the whim of the president.    
Morsi’s presidential election victory was a test to post 2011 Egyptian politics. 
Understanding the control the military held in the post-transition phase, he attempted to seize the 
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power they enjoyed. Through a series of moves, it seemed he had the upper-hand against the 
army, but he did not realize that most Egyptians repudiated the ideology of social and political- 
Islam espoused by him and his allies. Instead, Egyptians looked to the military to defend the 
secularism and diversity of Egypt when mass protests erupted in June 2013. Today, the military’s 
power is not rivaled by any institution. Democratic reforms are non-existent under the 
government of newly elected president and former general Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, the same person 
who led the overthrow of Morsi. A violent terrorist campaign against the military in the Sinai 
Peninsula by Islamic State affiliates has sidelined any discussion of political reforms before 
security can be reestablished.  
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